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NOTES
PRIVATE PENSIONS: ERISA
BENEFITS
AWARDS,

BY AMOUNTS
PREEMPTING

PERMITS OFFSETS OF PRIVATE PENSION
RECEIVED IN WORKER'S COMPENSATION
STATE LAWS PROHIBITING SUCH OFF-

SETS-Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,Inc., 101 S. Ct. 1895 (1981).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In response to a growing national concern over the loss of private
pension benefits by employees, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 1 Congress' primary concern was correcting the inadequate vesting and funding requirements
which frequently resulted in defeating retirees' post employment expectations.2 Through ERISA Congress sought to improve the equitable
character and soundness of such plans s by providing (1) nonforfeitable
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976) (hereinafter cited as ERISA). The Act governs two
types of employee benefit plans, "employee pension benefit plan[s]" and "employee welfare benefit
plan[sJ."
[An employee pension benefit plan] mean[s] any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund or program (A) provides retirement income to employees, or (B)
results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to termination of covered
employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to
the plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976).
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program
was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section
186(C) of this title (other than pension or retirement or death, and insurance to provide
such pensions).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976).
2. The criticisms of the private pension system prior to ERISA were primarily, (I) inadequate vesting, (2) insufficient funding, (3) irresponsibility of fiduciary, and (4) ineffective administration. For a discussion of the inequities prior to ERISA and the subsequent provisions to remedy
them, see Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and
Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 539 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ERISA, Policies and
Problems].
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(C) (1976). The preamble to ERISA notes:
[I]t is hereby further declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce,
the Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants in private pension plans and
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vested rights,' (2) minimum funding requirements,5 and (3) termina-

tion insurance6 to protect retirees from insolvent employers.
An additional goal of Congress was to encourage expansion of private pension plans. Congress was aware of the need to. minimize the
cost of maintaining a plan in order to achieve this additional goal.7
Thus, ERISA is an attempt to eliminate the inequities which plagued
the private pension system prior to its enactment, while simultaneously
avoiding undue expense to employers. In order to fulfill these objectives

without intrusive state interference, Congress included in the Act a
general preemption provision.8
Due to the complexity of the Act and the existence of competing

interests, i.e., assuring adequate funding to insure benefits upon retirement versus minimizing the cost to employer to encourage expansion,
various disputes have arisen over whether certain reductions in pension
benefits constitute. a forfeiture of vested rights in violation of section
their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and soundness of such plans by
requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of service,
to meet minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance.
Id. (emphasis added).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976). ERISA's minimum vesting provision requires, "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that an employee's right to his normal retirement benefit is nonforfeitable
upon the attainment of normal retirement age and in addition shall satisfy the paragraphs (1) and
(2) of this subsection.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(1) (1976). The minimum funding provision of ERISA requires,
Every employee pension benefit plan subject to this part shall satisfy the minimum funding
standard (or the alternative minimum funding standard under section 1085 of this title) for
any plan year to which this part applies. A plan to which this part applies shall have
satisfied the minimum funding standard for such plan for a year if as of the end of such
plan year the plan does not have an accumulated funding deficiency.
Id. (emphasis added).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1976). The provisions of ERISA establishing the plan termination
insurance provides,
There is established within the Department of Labor, a body corporate to be known as the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. [T]he purposes of this subchapter, which are to be
carried out by the corporation are (1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of
voluntary service pension plans for the benefit of the participants, (2) to provide for the
timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits toparticipants and beneficiaries
under plans to which this subchapter applies, and (3) to maintain premiums established by
the corporation under section 1306 of this title-at the lowest level consistent with carrying
out its obligations under this subchapter.
Id.
7. Congress' concern in limiting the cost of private plans to the employer in order to encourage expansion of the system is expressed in various reports. The Committee on Finance reported that it "recognized that private retirement plans are voluntary on the part of the employer,
and, therefore, it has carefully weighed the additional costs to the employer and minimized them
to the extent consistent with minimum standards for retirement benefits." Sen. Rept. No. 93-383,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in I ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 1069 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ERISA LEGIS.
HIST.]. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-807, note 49 and accompanying text infra.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976). See note 85 and accompanying text infra.
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1053 of ERISA. The United States Supreme Court resolved such a
dispute in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,Inc.9 The Alessi Court was
confronted with the issue whether a collectively bargained pension plan
allowing offsets of pension benefits by the amount of worker's compensatiQn awards constitutes such a forfeiture; 10 and if not, whether the
Act preempts a state worker's compensation law which expressly prohibits such offsets."
To determine the permissibility of the offsets it was necessary for
9. 101 S. Ct. 1895 (1981).
10. Id. at 1898. The worker's compensation offset issue has been addressed by various district courts with conflicting results. In Utility Workers Union v. Consumers Power Co., 453
F.Supp. 447, (E.D. Mich. 1978), the court invalidated the worker's compensation offset as contrary to ERISA § 1053(a) due to the difference in nature between worker's compensation and
pension payments. Id. at 456. Other district courts have invalidated this offset on the grounds that
worker's compensation reductions are not one of the permitted forfeitures enumerated in ERISA §
1053(3)(A). See Strong v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 472 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1979). Accord, Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867 (D.N.J.) affd on rehearing 464 F. Supp. 133
(1978) and Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., CA No. 78-0434 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 1979) consolidated & rev'd sub nom. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (3rd Cir. 1980), aff'd
sub nom. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 1895 (1981); Carpenter Technology
Corp. v. Boyton, No. 78-1415 (D. N.J. Dec. 12, 1979); Employee Benefits Committee, etc., of
Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. Pascoe, 504 F. Supp. 958 (D. Hawaii 1980).
Only three district court cases, all in Michigan, upheld the offsets as consistent with ERISA.
In Bordine v. Evans Products Company, 453 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Mich. 1978), the court recognized
that worker's compensation offsets were not among the enumerated forfeitures permitted by
ERISA; however, it found these exceptions were not absolute. See Carlson v. Bundy Corp., No. 672272 (E.D. Mich. 1977). The Bordine court relied on certain treasury regulations which it found
were designed to provide guidance for compliance with ERISA. As these regulations permitted
the worker's compensation offset in dispute, the court concluded they were consistent with
ERISA. Id. at 20. Accord, Pavlovic v. Chrysler Corp., No. 7-70438 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
In addition to the conflicting district court decisions, a split in the United States circuit courts
arose between the third and sixth circuits. In Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238
(3d Cir. 1980), the court held that since the treasury regulation was issued pursuant to a clear
delegation of rule-making authority by Congress, it was legislative and had the same effect as
valid statutes. Therefore, absent an abuse of discretion or direct conflict with ERISA, the regulation was valid. Id. at 1243. Based on such a standard the third circuit upheld the regulation
because there was no clear conflict in the legislative history. Id. The Buczynski court further
supported its conclusion on the grounds that ERISA did recognize exceptions to the forfeiture
provision other than those enumerated. Id. In addition, the court found insufficient distinction
between pension benefits and worker's compensation awards to warrant invalidation of the practice. Id. at 1246.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Utility Workers v. Consumers Power Co., 637 F.2d
1082 (6th Cir. 1981) held otherwise. The Utility Workers court upheld the district court's decision invalidating the offsets due to the differences in nature between worker's compensation and
pension benefits. Id. at 1089-91.
For a more complete discussion of the worker's compensation offset and its validity under
ERISA, see Comment, Can Workers Compensation Payments Offset Retirement Pension Benefits? 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 493 (1981).

11. Cases addressing the preemption issue when confronted with worker's compensation offsets' and state law expressly prohibiting them have reached conflicting decisions. For a discussion
of cases addressing the preemption issue and their reasoning, see notes 89-95 and accompanying
text infra.
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the Court to concern itself with the competing interest involved in such
a dispute. To permit such an offset may appear inconsistent with Congress' desire to assure a nonforfeiture of retiree's vested rights to his
pension benefits, but would be consistent with Congress' desire to reduce the cost to the employer, and thus encourage expansion of the
private pension system. Allowing this offset would enable the employer
to reduce his cost of maintaining the plan by calculating these payments into it."'
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Retired employees of General Motors Corp. and Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. brought separate suits to challenge their employers' plans'
provision for a reduction of their pension benefits by amounts received
in worker's compensation awards. These two suits were later removed
to the United States District Court of the District of New Jersey18
which found (1) the offsets were prohibited by ERISA's nonforfeiture
provision;" ' (2) thus the applicable treasury regulation and revenue rulings approving the offsets were invalid; and (3) even assuming the offsets were permitted under ERISA, they would be invalidated by the
New Jersey Worker's Compensation Act; as (4) Congress had not intended ERISA to preempt such state law.18
The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals, which reversed. 16 The appellate court held that such offsets
were implicitly allowed by Congress.17 Thus the offsets were permissible and the treasury regulation and revenue rulings allowing them were
consistent with ERISA.18 The court gave a broad interpretation to
ERISA section 1144, finding it preempted the New Jersey statute
prohibiting the offsets. 1
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of
the appeal taken from retirees of Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., and
granted certiorari on the petition of retirees of the General Motors
Corp. The Alessi Court unanimously' ° affirmed the third circuit's opin12. See note 49 and accompanying text infra.
13. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867 (D.N.J.), aflOd on rehearing 464
F. Supp. 133 (1978); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. No. 78-0434 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 1979),
consolidated and rev'd sub nom. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir.
1980), afd sub nom. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 1895 (1981).
14. 456 F. Supp. 867, 870.

15.

456 F. Supp. 867, 873.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1247.
Id. at 1250.
Justice Brennan took no part in the decision.
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ion on both issues,21 determining private pension benefits may be reduced by amounts received by the employee-retiree from worker's compensation awards, as they do not constitute a forfeiture within the
meaning of ERISA . The Alessi Court also ruled for the first time on
the scope of ERISA's preemption provision, section 1144. The Court
found that the New Jersey offset prohibition did sufficiently relate to
pension plans for the purposes of ERISA to be encompassed by the
federal law." Additionally, the Court found other federal interests involved also required preemption. 4
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Offset for Worker's Compensation Benefits Is Not a Forfeiture

When rendering its decision that the offsets in dispute did not violate ERISA, the Alessi Court used a two step process. The Court first
defined what a forfeiture was within the meaning of ERISA. It next
examined the worker's compensation offsets themselves to determine
whether they fell within this definition, concluding they did not.
1. What is a Forfeiture?
Justice Marshall's opinion begins with a discussion of ERISA's
nonforfeiture provision, section 1053(a), requiring "[e]ach pension plan
shall provide that an employee's right to his normal retirement benefits
is nonforfeitable upon the attainment of normal retirement age.' 5 The
Court concluded that, based upon this provision, the contested offsets
were not invalid per se.26 Noting the "facial accuracy"' 2 of retirees'
argument that (1) no vested benefits may be forfeited except those expressly provided for in section 1053(a)(3); and (2) worker's compensation offsets are not included therein, therefore, (3) the offsets constituted a forfeiture in violation of 1053(a), the Court nevertheless
rejected this claim.' 8 The Alessi Court found such reasoning to overlook the "threshold issue" of what defines the content of the benefit
that, once vested, cannot be forfeited.'
Therefore, the Court distinguished determining the content of the
21. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 1895 (1981), affg Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980).
22.
23.

Id. at 1900-05.
Id. at 1905-07.

24.

Id. at 1907.

25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1900 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1903.
Id. at 1900.

28.

Id. See also 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980).

29. by
101eCommons,
S. Ct. at 1900.
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benefit from providing for nonforfeitability of benefits, once vested. The
content or level of the benefit is the total amount to be paid to the
individual retiree upon attainment of retirement age.30 This amount
level is determined by calculating the various items agreed upon in
each employment plan to come up with a single figure. Such considerations as length of service, amount contributed by both employee and
employer, as well as various forms of supplemental post-retirement
benefits are added together to determine the level of the payment. It is
the retirees' claim to this level of benefit which ERISA makes
nonforfeitable.
The Alessi Court went on to explain that it was the private parties,3 1 the employer and employee bargaining agents, who determined
the level or contents of the benefits. After this bargained for benefit has
been agreed upon, section 1053(a) prohibits its forfeiture, once vested
in the employee.32 Such a conclusion is consistent with the Court's previous construction of the term "nonforfeitable" 83 in Nachman Corp. V.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp." The Nachman Court interpreted
nonforfeitable as describing "the quality of the participant's right to a
pension rather than a limit on the amount he may collect." 3 5 Under the
Nachman approach, the private parties agree upon the level of the benefit. Unless there is a forfeiture of the right to claim this bargained-for
benefit there can be no violation of ERISA. The Nachman Court held
"it is the claim to the benefit, rather than the benefit itself, that must
be 'unconditional' and 'legally enforceable against the plan."'" The
Alessi Court's reliance upon Nachman indicates its approval of granting a broad deference to the private parties in establishing and maintaining a plan. Instead of requiring a plan to establish a mandatory
level of benefits in a specified amount, the Court allowed the private
parties to take into consideration the various forms of supplemental income in calculating the benefit to which an individual retiree is
entitled.

30. ERISA defines a "normal retirement benefit" as "the greater of the early retirement
benefit under the plan, or the benefit under the plan commencing at normal retirement age." 29
U.S.C. § 1002(22) (1976) (emphasis added). The "under the plan" language indicates that the
level of the retirement benefit is to be determined by the pension planners and it is this amount for
which retiree is to have a nonforfeitable claim.
31. 101 S. Ct. at 1900.
32. Id.
33. Congress has defined the term "nonforfeitable" as a claim obtained by a participant or
his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises
from the participant's service, which is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the
plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (1976).
34. 446 U.S. 359 (1980).
35. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1900 (quoting 446 U.S. 359, 372-73 (1981)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/8
36. 446 U.S. 359, 371 (1981), quoted in 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1900 (1981).

1982]

NOTES

To further support this conclusion, the Alessi Court pointed out
that "rather than imposing mandatory pension levels or methods for
calculating benefits, Congress in ERISA set outer bounds on permissible accrual practices, 29 U.S.C. section 1054(b), and specified three
alternative schedules for the vesting of pension rights, 29 U.S.C. section 1053(a)(2). ' 7 Thus, provided the plan meets the minimum accrued benefit as described by ERISA under section 1054(b)(1)(2), and
assures retirees a legal right to that vested benefit under one of the
three schedules under section 1053(a), the private parties may determine the content of the benefit. The Alessi Court concluded, that absent a violation of these restrictions, each total benefit level may vary
from plan to plan. 88
2.

Worker's Compensation as an Integration

Despite the Alessi Court's apparent grant of broad discretion to
the private parties in determining the level of the benefit, the court did
not give these parties complete freedom; but instead limited them to
certain accepted practices.39 The Alessi definition of nonforfeiture as
not prohibiting the offset for worker compensation payments, would, on
its face, appear to narrowly limit the application of section 1053(a) as
an attack on the validity of pension plans. If so, pension planners could
interpret the Alessi decision as allowing offsets for nearly all other income sources. The Court limited its holding to worker's compensation
offsets, however, leaving no room for such a broad interpretation.
By concluding the parties planning the pension are to determine
the level of the benefits, 0 the Court did not grant per se validity to this
or any other offset. The Court found it necessary to determine whether
the offset was in accord with other practices in determining the level of
the benefit, as accepted by Congress when enacting ERISA. For the
37. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1900 (1981). ERISA provides for three alternative formulas for the
vesting of pension rights. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (1976). The first allows for a graded schedule
under which the participant becomes twenty-five percent vested after five years and receives an
additional five percent interest for each of the next five years and an additional ten percent for
each of the remaining five years. Id. § 1053(a)(2)(B). A second alternative offers a ten year
vesting schedule by which the participant is fully vested after ten years of service. Id. §
1053(a)(2)(A). The third alternative, referred to as the "rule of 45" provides that a worker with
at least five years of service must become fifty percent vested when the sum of his age and years of
service equals forty-five, after which an additional ten percent must become vested for each of the
next five years. Id. § 1053(a)(2)(C). See Comment, ERISA Preemption of State Law: The Meaning of "Relate To" in Section 514, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 143 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Preemption

of State Law). For a further explanation of these alternative vesting schedules, see ERISA. Policies and Problems, supra note 2, at 571-75.
38. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1901 (1981).
39. Id. at 1901-05.

40. by
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purpose of the issue before the Court, Justice Marshall found it "particularly pertinent" that "Congress did not prohibit 'integration' ", a
calculation practice under which benefit levels are determined by combining pension funds with other income streams available to retired
4 1
employees.
Integration, as described by the Alessi Court, is the contribution
of various income streams to the total benefit pool to be distributed to
all retirees.42 These income streams include non-pension funds, such as
worker's compensation, which are available to only a subgroup of employees. The private pension funds are integrated with these other income maintenance programs, including social security, and the pension
level is determined based on the entire pool. 43 The result of such a
practice is to assure that all the retirees receive a certain amount of
post-retirement income even though some achieve this payment strictly
through pension payments, while others achieve it by a combination of
the various income streams to which they are entitled. 4 '
The Alessi Court reasoned that allowing integration as a permissible calculation device would benefit the employees as a group because
it would allow a higher pension level "although an individual employee
may reach that level by a combination of payments from the pension
fund and payments from other income maintenance sources.' 45 The
Court's concern for the permissible use of integration shows its attempt
to balance the tension between the primary goal of benefitting the employees and the subsidiary goal of containing pension costs.
The Alessi Court correctly pointed out that the practice of integration with benefits under the Social Security Act' 6 and Railroad Retirement Act' 7 was expressly preserved by Congress. 4' Following a discussion of Congress' consideration of these particular offsets 4' the
41.

101 S. Ct. 1895, 1901 (1981).

42.
43.

Id.
id.

44.

For an extensive explanation of what an integration is, as well as the various types of

integration, see Comment, Qualified Pension and Profit Sharing Plans: Integration with Social
Security, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 119 (1974).

45. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1901 (1981).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 401-02 (1976).
47. 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1976).
48. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1902 (1981). The Alessi Court cited various sections of 29 U.S.C. §
1054 (1976), the provision which sets forth the requirements for accrual of benefits to meet
ERISA approval, to support its finding that social security benefits were a permissible integration.
"A defined benefit plan satisfies the requirements of [§ 1054) if under the plan ...social security benefits and all other relevant factors used to compute benefits shall be treated as remaining
constant as of the current year for all years after the current year." Id. § 1054(b)(1)(B)(iv)
(emphasis added). See Id. § 1054(b)(1)(C), for similar language with reference to social security.
49. The Alessi Court referred to various legislative history which clearly indicated Congress' awareness of the use of Social Security integration prior to ERISA. The House Ways and
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/8
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Court concluded that, by setting a limitation on integration with these
benefits, "Congress acknowledged and accepted the practice, rather
than prohibiting it." 50 The Court recognized that Congress permitted
these integration practices (at least with social security and railroad
retirement benefits) without finding it necessary to add an exemption
for this purpose to ERISA's nonforfeiture provision. Consequently, the
Court was "unpersuaded by retirees' claim that the nonforfeiture provisions by their own force prohibit any offset of pension benefits by
worker's compensation awards."' 1 The worker's compensation offsets
used by General Motors and Raybestos-Manhattan work much like the
integrations with social security or railroad retirement payments allowed by Congress. Under each the individual employee remains entitled to the established pension level, but payments received from the
pension fund are reduced by the amount received from the other income streams. 2
Means Committee report noted the proposed bill would,
not affect the ability of plans to use the integration procedures to reduce the benefits that
they pay to individuals who are currently covered when social security benefits are liberalized. Your Committee, however, believes that such practices raise important issues. On the
one hand, the objective of the Congress in increasing social security benefits might be considered to be frustrated to the extent that individuals with low and moderate incomes have
their private retirement benefits reduced as a result of the integration procedures. On the
other hand, your Committee is very much aware that many present plans are fully or
partly integrated and that elimination of the integration procedures could substantially increase the cost of financing private plans. Employees, as a whole, might be injured rather
than aided if such cost increases resulted in slowing down the growth or perhaps even
elimina[ting] private retirement plans.
101 S. Ct. 1895, 1902 (1981) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1974), reprinted in II ERISA, LEGIs. HIST., at 3189 (1976)).
The Court also took cognizance of the fact that the bill had originally included a provision to
temporarily restrict any increases in pension reductions due to increases in Social Security benefits
accruing after December 31, 1971. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1902 n.12 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1280 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 277; reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639. Its subsequent
deletion was explained on grounds of increased cost which might result in termination of private
pension plans. See Sen. Harrison Williams 120 Cong. Rec. 29928, reprinted in III ERISA LEGIS.
HIST. at 4732 (1976).
50. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1902 (1981). The Alessi Court cited 29 U.S.C. § 1056(b) (1976) to
support its conclusion. Section 1056(b) deals with the form and payment of benefits under ERISA
and provides,
If (i) a participant or beneficiary is receiving benefits under a pension plan, or (2) a participant is separated from the service and has nonforfeitable rights to benefits, a plan may
not decrease benefits of such participant by reason of any increase in the benefit levels
payable under Title II of the Social Security Act or the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937,
or any increase in the wage base under such Title If,if such increase takes place after
September 2, 1974, or (if later) the earlier of the date of first entitlement of such benefits
or the date of such separation.
The Alessi Court concluded § 1056(b) did not give clear Congressional expression to maintain
these integration practices under ERISA.
51. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1902 (1981).
52. Id.
1902-03. The1981
Alessi Court concluded that § 1053 had no more applicability to
Published
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The Alessi Court's conclusion that the disputed offsets are sufficiently like integration practices is the key to the Court's ultimate finding that the offsets are permissible. Before rendering this decision, however, the Court needed to address retirees' various arguments that such
a finding was inappropriate. Because the legislative history is silent on
the particular offset for worker's compensation, the Court found it necessary to discuss whether Congress' adoption of the integration practice
was limited to those federal benefits expressly addressed in the Act.58
In opposition to such a claim, the Court referred to a current regulation 5 issued by the Internal Revenue Service 55 permitting integration
with other federal and state benefits. In addition, the Court took notice
of certain revenue rulings" issued prior to ERISA which expressly approve of such offsets.
The retirees put forth two contentions alleging that the 'Treasury
regulation and revenue rulings contravene ERISA. First, the retirees
objected to the validity of the regulation and rulings on the grounds
that ERISA's approval of integration was limited to social security and
railroad retirement payments.5 7 Second, retirees contended that "workers' compensation awards are so different in kind from social security

worker's compensation integration than the analogous reduction permitted for social security or
railroad retirement payments because "the same Congressional purpose-promoting a system of
private pensions by giving employers avenues for cutting the cost of their pension obligations-underlies all such offset possibilities." Id. The Court's finding on this point implied that
permissible offsets as integrations are based upon the fact each system is funded by the employer;
therefore, where the payments come from the same fund, there is strong likelihood that they will
be similarly treated as integrations. Accord, Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238
(3d Cir. 1980). For a further discussion on this point, see note 80 and accompanying text infra.
53. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1903 (1981).
54. The relevant regulation provides in part: "Furthermore, nonforfeitable rights are not
considered to be forfeitable by reason of the fact that they may be reduced to take into account
benefits which are provided under any other Federal or State law and which are taken into account in determining plan benefits." 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(a)-4(a) (1979).
55. The tax code requirement for pension plans was enacted in title II of ERISA. ERISA
expressly provides that Treasury Department regulations under the tax code pension provisions,
I.R.C. §§ 401-420, shall apply to the analogous provisions of ERISA codified in title 29 of the
United States Code. See 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1976).
56. See Rev. Rul. 421, pt. 4(j), 1969-2 C.B. 72; Rev. Rul. 243, 1968-1 C.B. 157. The pertinent language of 68-243, later encompassed by 69-421 part 4U), is as follows:
(4) Integration with Benefits Provided Under Other Programs - Benefits provided under a
pension, annuity, profit sharing or stock bonus plan may be integrated with those provided
under a State or Federal program, that like the Social Security program, requires employer
contributions and makes benefits available to the general public. Thus, benefits payable
under a state workmen's compensation law. . . may be an acceptable offset against benefits payable under a qualified plan. However, benefits payable under a qualified plan may
not be offset by disability damages recovered by an employee in a common law action
against the employer.
Id. (emphasis added) (This Rev. Rul. was rendered obsolete by Rev. Rul. 488, 1972-2 C.B. 649).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/8
57. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1903 (198'1).
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and railroad retirement payments that their integration could not be
authorized under the same rubric.""
The Alessi Court found the retirees' first contention easily dismissible because of its prior conclusion that, since ERISA does not prescribe the level of pension benefits, the reduction of pension benefits
based on the integration procedure is not per se prohibited by ERISA's
nonforfeiture provision. 5 ' Because Congress had accepted and acknowledged the practice of integration the Court apparently reasoned that,
absent Congressional intent to the contrary, worker's compensation reductions should be evaluated as a possible permissible use of this-

practice.60
Following its brief dismissal of this objection, the-Alessi Court
found it necessary to give greater attention to the retirees' second
claim. The Alessi Court nevertheless ultimately rejected retirees' claim
that worker's compensation is so different in kind that offset for its
payments is unsupported by the rationale behind the integration of pension funds with social security and railroad retirement benefits. 61
In developing this argument, retirees attempted to distinguish
worker's compensation from social security and railroad retirement
payments due to the lack of "identity of purpose"' between what the
payments represent. Retirees claimed worker's compensation should be
treated the same as common law tort damages because the purpose of
worker's compensation, like tort recoveries from an employer, is to
make whole or reimburse an employee for work-related injuries." In
contrast, retirees contended, the purpose of social security, railroad retirement, and private pension payments is to supply income to substitute for wages lost due to retirement."
A similar argument was put forth and upheld by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals when it decided the validity of the worker's compensation offsets in Utility Workers v. Consumers Power Co.6" The Utility
Workers court focused on "the source of entitlement" to the particular
payment as the factor determinative of whether the benefit is like a

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 1904.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The Court discussed the difference in judicial treatment between worker's compensation payments and tort judgments. Id. at 1904 n.16. Retirees made this claim because the I.R.S.
has clearly established that recoveries in personal injury suits against an employer may not be
used to reduce pension benefits. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
64. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1904 (1981).
65. 637
F.2d 1082 (6th1981
Cir. 1981).
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pension for integration
purposes." Relying upon Congress' definition of
"nonforfeitable" 6 7 under ERISA, particularly the phrase, "which arises
from the participant'sservice,"" the Utility Workers court concluded
this was an indication that it is the service of the employee which gives
rise to his accrued benefit."O It concluded the "source of entitlement"
for social security, railroad retirement, and private pension benefits was
the years of service performed for the employer,70 thus these benefits
are in the nature of deferred wages.7 1 The sixth circuit concluded
worker's compensation was distinguishable because it is triggered by an
injury, and not by the employee's term of service. 2
The "identity of purpose" theory put forth by retirees in Alessi
and the "source of entitlement" theory adopted by the Utility Workers
court are both attempts to distinguish worker's compensation from
other federal benefits for purposes of determining the proper use of integration. Both theories view the federal benefits as income earned
through years of service for the employer, but view worker's compensation as compensation for injury.
The Alessi Court rejected such an attempt to distinguish worker's
compensation awards from other federal benefits on two grounds. The
Court found that neither the Social Security Act nor the Railroad Retirement Act supports such a claim.73 In addition, the Court noted
Congress knew and approved of I.R.S. rulings permitting integration,
and recognized that the rulings do not draw the line between permissi74
ble and impermissible integration where retirees prefer.
The Alessi Court noted that retirees' claim presumes that ERISA

66. Id. at 1091.
67. See note 33 supra.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (1976) (emphasis added).
69. 637 F.2d 1082, 1091 (6th Cir. 1981).
70. Id.
71. Id. The view of pension benefits as deferred wages has been widely accepted today; the
theory was proposed as early as 1913, and derived substantial support in case law since pensions
were held to be "wages" within the meaning of section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.
Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
However, at various times other theories on the nature of pension benefits were viewed with some
popularity. For example, (1)The Gratuity Theory viewed all private pensions as coming from a

grateful employer in recognition of long and faithful service;,(2) The Promissory Estoppel Theory
held that if an employer by words or deeds created justifiable expectations of retirement benefits
on the part of his labor force, he would be judicially prohibited from denying these benefits to
those who satisfied all conditions of entitlement; and (3) The Unilateral Contract Theory treats a
plan as an offer by the employer to enter into a unilateral contract to provide benefits under
certain conditions, which offer is accepted by the employee by remaining in the service of the
employer until retirement. See D. McGILL, FULLFILLING PENSION EXPECTATIONS at 161-65
(1962).
72. 637 F.2d 1082, 1091 (6th Cir. 1981).
73. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1904 (1981).
74. Id.
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permits integration with other benefits only where there is an identity
between the purposes of pension payments and purposes of other integrated benefits."5 The Court discredited such a claim, however, by indicating that not even the funds which Congress had approved for inte7
gration shared the identity of purpose ascribed to them by retirees .
The Court noted "both the Social Security and Railroad Retirement
Acts provide payments for disability as well as for wages lost due to
retirement, and ERISA permits pension integration without distinguishing these different kinds of benefits.""7 Such a finding by the
Court undercuts retirees' identity of purpose argument because disability benefits also provide payment for injury, thus serving much the
same purpose as worker's compensation awards, yet Congress allows
for their integration with private pensions.
To further support its conclusion that the revenue rulings themselves do not contravene ERISA, the Alessi Court found that when
Congress enacted ERISA, it knew of the I.R.S. rulings permitting integration and left them in effect.7 8 The rulings do not necessarily refute
the identity of purpose theory put forth by retirees, but merely seem to
draw the line at a different place in determining what is a permissible
use of integration.7 9 These I.R.S. rulings base their allowance of pension payment integration on three factors; provided a particular reduction meets these requirements it may be integrated with the pension
benefit. The factors in the ruling require that "the employer must contribute to the other benefit funds, these other funds must be designed
for general public use, and the benefits they supply must correspond to
benefits available under the pension plan." 80 When these conditions are
satisfied, the I.R.S. has consistently upheld reductions as permissible
integrations with private pensions.8 1
By setting these criteria the I.R.S. recognized that not all offsets
are permissible. But, contrary to retirees' preference, to determine permissibility the I.R.S. focuses on the source of the funds and their avail-

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. See Rev. Rul. 243, 1968-1 C.B. 157, note 56 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 56 and accompanying text supra. In this revenue ruling the I.R.S. upheld
worker's compensation as a permissible integration with pension benefits. However, various other
rulings have invalidated certain attempts to integrate pension benefits. See Rev. Rul. 69-421 pt.
4(j)(4), C.B. 1962-2, 72; Rev. Rul. 68-243, C.B. 157-158 (I.R.S. disallowed offsets of pension
benefits with damages recovered through common law tort judgment against employer); Rev. Rul.
78-178, C.B. 1978-1, at 118 (I.R.S. disallowed integration with reimbursement for medical expenses and integration with unemployment compensation). These rulings indicate the Service's
consistent application of the three factors listed above.
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ability to the general public,"1 and not on the purposes for which each
payment is intended as compensation. The Court concluded that, since
the I.R.S. has found worker's compensation offsets may be appropriately treated as an integration, it would "defer to the consistent agency
position that is itself reasonable and consonant with the Act."8 Thus,

although retirees' "identity of purpose" theory is not totally baseless, it
must be rejected in favor of the Service's standards, as long as its rules
are not contrary to legislative purposes.
To further support its deference to the I.R.S. position, the Alessi
Court pointed out that Congress was not only aware of, but actually
embraced, such revenue rulings when enacting ERISA." Thus Con-

gress implicitly permitted worker's compensation integration as approved by the I.R.S. The Alessi Court concluded that it was not its
"judicial function. . . to second-guess the policy decisions of the legis-

lature, no matter how appealing [it] may find contrary rationales." 8 '
The Alessi Court had thus held that the integration of worker's

compensation with private pension benefits does not contravene
ERISA. This conclusion did not, however, end the Court's inquiry into
ERISA, because unless ERISA preempted the New Jersey statute expressly prohibiting such offsets," the General Motors and RaybestosManhattan plans were still invalidated by state law.
B.

ERISA's Preemption of State Law

Ordinarily where state law expressly prohibits a federally permissible activity, the preemption issue will be addressed first because a find-

ing of no preemption is dispositive of any further inquiry. In this case,
82. The Alessi Court's finding with regard to the appropriate criteria for establishing
whether a pension reduction is a permissible integration under ERISA is consistent with the theory that worker's compensation is merely one unit in an overall system of wage loss protection. 4
A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS § 97.00 (1979). If worker's compensation is
viewed in this way rather than as resembling a recovery in a tort action, the conclusion follows
that duplication of benefits from different parts of the overall system should not be permitted. Id.
83. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1904, 1905 n.16 (1981).
84. Id. at 1905. The Alessi Court was correct in finding Congress was aware of the I.R.S.'s
use of integration in determinifig pension levels; however, it is not clear whether Congress was
aware of the particular practice of integrating worker's compensation awards. The committee reports to which the Court refers discuss integration in regard to approval of existing antidiscrimination rules, but make no reference to worker's compensation. See H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 277, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5058. Therefore,
the Court's subsequent conclusion that Congress embraced worker's compensation offsets is not
clear.
85. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1905 (1981).
86. The New Jersey Workers' Compensation Statute provides in part: "The right of compensation granted by this chapter may be set off against disability pension benefits or payments
but shall not be set off against employees' retirement pension benefits or payments." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34: 15-29 (West Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
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however, the Court found it necessary to address the offset issue at the
outset in order to find the connection between the state law and the
pension plan necessary to support its conclusion that ERISA did indeed
preempt the New Jersey statute in question.
The Alessi Court began its preemption analysis by expressing its
concerns for federalism, noting that the "exercise of federal supremacy
is not lightly presumed.18 7 The Court found, however, that the specific
preemption provision in ERISA was sufficient indication of Congress'
intent to authorize judicial intervention."' The Alessi Court therefore
proceeded to address the issue whether ERISA preempted the New
Jersey Worker's Compensation Law in question.
1. The "Relate to" Requirement
ERISA section 1144(a), the preemption section, provides that
"[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
thi subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan ... ."" The wording of this provision clearly indicates that if the state law "relates to" the benefit plan, ERISA shall
supersede and invalidate that law. Therefore, the specific issue confronting the Alessi Court was whether New Jersey Stat. Ann. 34:1529, the state law prohibiting offsets for worker's compensation, sufficiently "relates to" the General Motors and Raybestos-Manhattan
plans to warrant preemption." Relying on its earlier finding that the
worker's compensation offsets were permissible as an integration, the
Alessi Court concluded that the state law did "relate to" the plans and
was therefore preempted by ERISA.91 Due to conflicting interpretations of the meaning of "relate to" in lower court decisions, however,
the Alessi Court found it necessary to address its meaning under section 1144(a). 91

87. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1905 (1981) (citing New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952)).
88. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1906 (1981).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976) (emphasis added). The scope of ERISA isexpressly limited
by the Act itself. The statute explicitly preserves state regulation of "insurance, banking, or securities." Id. § I144(b)(2)(A) and "generally applicable criminal law(s) of a State." id. §
1144(b)(4).
90. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1906 (1981).
91. Id. at 1908.
92. The Alessi Court recognized the confusion which had resulted from the "relate to"
requirement of § 1144(a). 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1906, as indicated by the Court's reference to the
conflicting decisions and rationales between the district court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on the scope of ERISA preemption. Id.
Published
by eCommons, 1981

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 7:2

2. The Meaning of "Relate to"
The conflict regarding the "relate to" requirement of section
1144(a) centers around the scope of Congress' preemptive intent.
Courts addressing the issue have split over whether this provision requires direct interference with the benefit plan or whether an indirect
relation is sufficient. 8 As the Supreme Court pointed out in Alessi,"
the district courts in both Buczynski v. General Motors Corp.95 and
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc." denied the preemption challenges because they viewed ERISA as preempting only when a state
law directly interferes with, or "relates to" a pension plan. The reasoning of these lower court opinions was that because the New Jersey statute addressed worker's compensation and not pension plans it only "related to" the plan indirectly and therefore was not preempted.' The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected these analyses and
reversed." It interpreted the "relate to pension plans" language as indicating a broad preemptive intent. 9 Because the purpose of the New
Jersey law was to create an additional requirement for pension plans
not permitted by ERISA, the third circuit reasoned, its broad scope
required preemption.100
The Supreme Court in Alessi agreed with the third circuit's finding; however, it based its conclusion on different reasoning.101 Primarily, the Alessi Court determined that "whatever the purpose or purposes of the New Jersey statute . . . it relate[s] to pension plans

governed by ERISA because it eliminates one method of calculating
pension benefits -

integration -

that is permitted by federal law."102

Thus the Supreme Court strongly relied upon its earlier finding that
private pension benefits may be offset by worker's compensation
awards. The Court reasoned that since it was permissible for the private parties to integrate these funds in calculating the level of the pension benefit, the New Jersey statute directly "relates to" the pension

93. 101 S. Ct. at 1906.
94. Id.
95. 456 F. Supp. 867 (D.N.J.), affd on rehearing 464 F. Supp. 133 (1978), rev'd Buczynski
v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980).
96. No. 78-0434 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 1979), rev'd Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616
F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980).
97. 456 F. Supp. 867, 873 (D.N.J.); affd on rehearing 464 F. Supp. 133 (1978), rev'd
Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980).
98. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980).
99. Id. at 1250. The Buczynski Court here concluded that "it [was] clear that the preemption provision is intended to be read in its normal dictionary sense." Id.
100. Id.
101. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1907 (1981).
102. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/8

19821

NOTES

plan as it expressly prohibits a federally permissible calculation technique for purposes of ERISA. 10 8
From this language the Alessi Court indicated that ERISA requires a direct relationship in order for section 1144(a) to be involved
as superseding the state law. The Alessi Court, however, did not wish
to impose such a narrow view on the scope of ERISA's preemption.
This is evidenced by its further effort to discredit the direct relationship
requirement adopted by the district court. 1 " Relying on the ERISA
definition of state, the Court concluded the Act makes clear that "even
indirect state action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon
[an] area of exclusive federal concern." 10 5 Section 1144(c)(2) defines
state to include: "a State, any political subdivision thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly
or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this title." 1° The Alessi Court concluded, therefore, that the
drafters of ERISA "clearly meant to preclude the States from avoiding
through form the substance of the pre-emption provision."1w7
C.

Effect of the Alessi Decision

The Alessi Court overruled the district court's attempt to uphold
the New Jersey law on the grounds that because it is a worker's compensation law and not a law directly dealing with pension plans there is
only an indirect relationship.1 0 8 Such an argument is clearly insufficient
under the Alessi findings as this would merely be the state's attempt to
avoid through form the substance of section 1144(a).
The Alessi opinion should not be read as giving approval to the
third circuit's view of section 1144(a) showing broad preemptive intent. 109 Under this broad view nearly all state laws which would intrude
upon a pension plan, no matter how indirectly or remotely, would be
invalidated. The Alessi Court did not support such a reading of
ERISA's preemption. Although the Court agreed that even indirect intrusions may violate ERISA, it still discussed how the New Jersey law

103. Id.
104. See notes 94 and 95 and accompanying text supra.
105. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1907 (1981). The Alessi Court discussed earlier in the opinion how
ERISA's preemption provision § 1144(a) demonstrated Congressional intent to depart from its
previous legislation that 'envisioned the exercise of state regulation over pension funds'. Id. at
1906 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 512, 514 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
Through ERISA Congress therefore meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a
federal concern. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1906 (1981).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 1444(c)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
107. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1907 (1981).
108. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
109. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
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related to the General Motors and Raybestos-Manhattan plans. Under
the Alessi facts there was a clear relationship between the state law's
prohibition, and the federal law's permission of the worker's compensation offset. Although the Court failed to specify how close a relationship must exist between a state law and ERISA, it did indicate that a
remote relationship would be insufficient to trigger ERISA preemption.
Consequently, the Alessi Court has apparently rejected the broad interpretation of ERISA's preemptive effect put forth by the Buczynski
court.
Perhaps even more supportive of the Court's refusal to adopt such
a broad view is the fact that in the various lower courts there have been
conflicting views of the preemptive language in areas of law outside
worker's compensation. 110 The Alessi Court was aware of such decisions but clearly refused to express its views on the merits of each. 1
Had the Court supported broad preemptive scope of the preemption
provision, it could have made such finding implicit so as to give the
lower courts some guidance. Its refusal to do so indicates its desire to
limit its holding to the precise preemptive dispute before it."'
The Alessi opinion indicates the Supreme Court's support of a
standard for preemption which lies somewhere between the narrow direct relationship view put forth in the district court and the broad preemptive view of the circuit court. The Supreme Court, however, has
failed to express exactly where that point is. The Alessi Court did
clearly decide that state laws which would prohibit worker's compensation offsets are preempted by ERISA. Beyond this, however, its holding
gave little indication what standards courts should use when presented
with ERISA preemption issues outside the area of worker's compensation offsets.
Absent a prohibition of a federally permissible practice under
ERISA, such as the New Jersey law, it is not clear how indirect a
110. ERISA's preemption provision § 144(a) has spawned considerable litigation over its
scope, particularly in relation to state laws concerning insurance, domestic relations, and civil
rights. This same question has arisen on occasion in other contexts such as debtor-creditor relations, taxation, professional licehsing and regulation, and restitution. For a comprehensive discussion of the various cases and their conflicting decisions, see Preemption of State Law, note 37
supra.
111. 101 S. Ct. 1895, 1907 n.21 (1981).
112. To further support its conclusion that the New Jersey statute was preempted, the
Alessi Court noted that "where, as here, the pension plans emerge from collective bargaining, the
additional federal interest in precluding state interference with labor-management negotiations
calls for pre-emption of state efforts to regulate pension terms." Id. at 1907 (citing Teamsters
Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296 (1959); Railway Exmployees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,
232 (1956)). Although this conclusion is supported by case law, the cases cited speak little to the
"relate to" requirement and were merely added for the purpose, as the Court points out, of bolstering its conclusion. Id.
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relationship between a state law and a pension plan need be to warrant
preemption. The Alessi opinion suggests the Supreme Court will handle these disputes on a case-by-case analysis. The practical effect is to
continue to permit the conflicting results in the various jurisdictions in
those areas other than worker's compensation until the Court chooses
to hear the dispute, a challenge it has been reluctant to confront in
recent years.1 13
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Alessi determined that private pension benefits may be reduced by amounts received in worker's compensation
awards. The Court showed concern for the competing interests involved
when Congress enacted ERISA. Although the primary goal of ERISA

was to assure retirees of post-employment income by providing nonforfeitable vested rights, the Court realized the need to keep cost of the
plans to a minimum to encourage expansion of the private pension system. The Alessi Court noted that prior to ERISA such payments were
treated as proper integration practices; it therefore concluded Congress
has approved of such practices when it enacted the legislation.11 4 Thus,
absent Congressional change, 115 worker's compensation offsets are permissible integration devices for the purpose of calculating the level of
pension benefits to which each retiree is entitled.
The Alessi Court further found ERISA to preempt any state law
which prohibits such offsets."' The Court found that the New Jersey
law which prohibited the integration of private pension benefits with
worker's compensation awards was contrary to ERISA because it eliminated a federally permissible practice for calculating the level of pension benefits.1 17 Beyond this finding, the Alessi opinion regarding pre-

113. The Supreme Court has twice refused to hear the preemption issue in regard to state
insurance laws when confronted with the opportunity. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70,
76-78 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978) (gave broad interpretaion of ERISA's preemptive
effect); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affid per curiam,
571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) (likewise gave broad interpretation to
ERISA preemption).
114. See note 83 supra.
115. In 1979 a bill was introduced to the Senate which would have amended ERISA to
expressly prohibit the offset upheld in Alessi. The bill provides in part,
(a) pension plan may not reduce or suspend retirement pension benefits being received by a
participant or beneficiary or retirement pension benefits in which a participant is separated
from service has a nonforfeitable right by reason of any payment made to the participant
or beneficiary by the employer maintaining the plan as the result of an award or settlement
made under or pursuant to a worker's compensation law.
S.209 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 126(a)(3), at 26-27 [1979]. This bill was never enacted.
116. See note 90 supra.
117. by
SeeeCommons,
note 101 supra.
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emption is an unsatisfactory decision because it fails to establish any
clear standards on the meaning of "relate to" under ERISA's preemption provision. Although the Court answered the specific issue on preemption of a worker's compensation law, it failed to adequately establish workable standards which lower courts may use to uniformly
describe the effect of certain state laws on ERISA.
Edward J. Dowd
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